CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STANDING-NEXT FRIEND STANDING
DENIED To PRISONER WHO ASSERTED CLAIM ON BEHALF OF A
FELLOW DEATH Row INMATE WHO WAIVED HIS RIGHT To ApPEAL-Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990).
A next friend is "[olne acting for benefit of infant, married
not suijuris,' without being regularly
woman, or other person
2
appointed guardian."
The doctrine of standing was created to determine whether a
party seeking judicial relief is the proper party to do so.3 This determination serves to limit federal judicial power to only those cases
that properly fall under the article III "case or controversy" requirement.4 Therefore, a court may justifiably deny adjudication of an
otherwise justiciable claim based on a party's lack of standing. 5
During the last twenty years, the United States Supreme Court's
approach to standing has been somewhat inconsistent. 6 OccasionI "Having capacity to manage one's own affairs; not under legal disability to act
for one's self." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1286 (5th ed. 1979).
2 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 941 (5th ed. 1979).
3 See Doernberg, "We the People".- John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and
Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 68-69 (1985). "The
fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his
complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Id. at 69 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)). The doctrine of
standing invokes a two-part test. Id. at 53. First, the court must examine whether
the plaintiff has "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues ..... Id.
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). This "personal stake" has also
been referred to as "injury in fact." Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United For Separation of Church & State, Inc., 445 U.S. 464, 472
(1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-74
(1978)). Second, there must be "some connection between the official action challenged and some legally protected interest of the party challenging the action." Id.
(quotingJenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969)).
4 Id. at 68.
The judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to
'cases' or 'controversies'.... Embodied in the words 'cases' and 'controversies' are two complementary but somewhat different limitations.
In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those
words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation
of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas
committed to other branches of the government. Justiciability is the
term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed
upon federal courts by the case-or-controversy doctrine.
Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968)).
5 Id. at 69.
6 Id. at 92.

155

156

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:155

ally, the Court has appeared to pursue a liberal course which 7 led to
an increased judicial acceptance of third party standing arguments.8
In other instances, the Court has utilized an extremely restrictive
approach,9 which insists on a more substantial third party relationship.'O Despite this incongruency, the Court has consistently denied
standing to third party next friend claims asserted on behalf of a
convicted capital defendant who has waived his right to appellate
review. "
Recently, this judicial tendency was addressed in Whitmore v. Arkansas.12 In Whitmore, the Court denied a death row inmate, Jonas
Whitmore, next friend standing to bring a petition on behalf of a
fellow death row inmate, Gene Simmons, who had waived his right
to appeal his sentence.13 Simmons was tried,' 4 convicted of capital
7 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978)
(Court granted third party standing to environmental groups and individuals challenging legislative liability limitation for private developers of nuclear power
plants); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (Court granted third
party standing to vendors of contraceptive devices, on behalf of themselves and
potential purchasers, challenging legislative limitation on access to contraceptives);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Court granted third party standing to beer
vendor challenging a gender-based discrimination of sale of beer); United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (Court granted third party standing to environmental
group challenging an Interstate Commerce Commission ruling permitting railroads
to access surcharge for transporting recyclable materials).
8 DOERNBERG, supra note 3, at 92.
9 Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (Court denied plaintiffs'
standing to challenge suburban zoning ordinance as violation of Civil Rights Act).
In a dissenting opinionJustice Douglas joined by Justice Brennan, charged that the
majority was being antagonistic in its interpretation of the plaintiffs' complaint. Id.
at 92 n.263 (1985) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)). The dissent stated:
The opinion, which tosses out of court almost every conceivable kind
of plaintiff who could be injured by the activity claimed to be unconstitutional, can be explained only by an indefensible hostility to the
claim on the merits. I can appreciate the Court's reluctance to adjudicate the complex and difficult legal questions involved.... But courts
cannot refuse to hear a case on the merits merely because they would
prefer not to, and it is quite clear, when the record is viewed with
dispassion, that at least three of the groups of plaintiffs have made
allegations, and supported them with affidavits and documentary evidence, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 520-21 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
10 Id. at 92.
11 See Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306 (Rehnquist, CircuitJustice (1979)), stay of
execution denied, 494 U.S. 807 (1979) (mem.); Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice (1979)), stay of execution denied, 440 U.S. 987 (1979)
(mem.); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
12 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990).
13 Id. at 1721.
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murder, and sentenced to death for the murders of two individuals
and fourteen members of his family. 5 Subsequently, Simmons
waived his right to appeal.' 6 The trial court conducted hearings and
determined that Simmons was competent to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his right to appellate review. 7 The Arkansas
Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed these determinations.'"
Whitmore then petitioned the Arkansas Supreme Court asking
to intervene both individually and as next friend of Simmons.19 The
court dismissed the motion finding that Whitmore lacked standing.2" As a result, Whitmore sought a stay of execution from the
United States Supreme Court. 2 ' The Court granted the stay pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.2 2 Ultimately, the Court
granted certiorari.2"
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,2 4 concluded that
14 Id. Simmons was tried in two separate proceedings. Id. First, he was tried for
a shooting rampage in Russellville, Arkansas, where he killed two people and injured three others. Id. Simmons was then tried for the murders of fourteen members of his family. Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1721-22. After his first sentence, Simmons waived his rights under oath,
by swearing, "I, Ronald Gene Simmons, Sr., want it to be known that it is my wish
and my desire that absolutely no action by anybody be taken to appeal or in any way
change this sentence. It is further respectfully requested that this sentence be carried out expeditiously." Id. at 1721 (quoting Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 183, 754
S.W.2d 839, 840 (1988)).
17 Id.
18 Id. The Arkansas Supreme Court denied LouisJ. Franz, a Catholic priest who
counseled inmates, next friend standing to assert a petition on Simmons' behalf.
Id. The court dismissed Franz's appeal reasoning that he failed to establish any
relationship with the defendant. Id. The court further noted that a mandatory appeal of all death sentences is not required in Arkansas. Id. Also, the court stated
that a defendant may forgo his appeal "only if he has been judicially determined to
have the capacity to understand the choice between life and death and to knowingly
and intelligently waive any and all rights to appeal his sentence." Id. (quoting
Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 189, 754 S.W.2d 839, 843 (1988)).
Subsequently, Hill, a death row inmate, joined Franz in petitioning the federal
court for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. This petition was also dismissed for lack of
standing. Id. (citing Franz v. Lockhart, 700 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Ark. 1988)).
19 Id. at 1722. Franz and Hill petitioned the court after the first capital murder
conviction. Id. at 1721. Whitmore, however, sought permission to intervene after
the second capital murder conviction for the murder of the Simmons' family members. Id. at 1722.
20 Id. (citing Simmons v. State, 298 Ark. 255, 766 S.W.2d 423 (1989)).
21 Id.
22 Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 109 S. Ct. 1522 (1989) (Court granted stay
of execution).
23 Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989)).
24 Id. at 1721. ChiefJustice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court and
was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
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Whitmore lacked next friend standing to challenge the propriety of
Simmons' death sentence. 2 5 The decision was based on two factors. 26 First, the Court noted that Simmons competently waived all
rights to appellate review.2 7 Second, the Court recognized that
Whitmore may not have been acting in Simmons' best interests.2 8
Thus, the Court concluded that Whitmore failed to allege facts sufficient to support his status as next friend.2 9
The concept of next friend standing in connection with filing a
petition on behalf of a detained prisoner has its roots in the seventeenth century. 0 The English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, allowed
the filing of a writ of habeas corpus for a convicted prisoner.3 ' In
1704, the House of Lords recognized "that every Englishman, who
is imprisoned by any authority whatsoever, has an undoubted right,
by his agents or friends, to apply for and obtain a Writ of Habeas
32
Corpus, in order to procure his liberty by due course of law."
At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court, in Gusman v.
Marrero3 denied standing to an individual asserting a claim on behalf of a capital prisoner.3 4 The Court determined that a private
citizen did not have next friend standing to bring a civil action to
secure a capital prisoner's right to appeal.3 5 The majority noted
that their decision would not be swayed by the emotional sensitivities of the situation. 6 The Court also emphasized that it would also
Id. at 1720-21. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice
Brennan. Id. at 1721, 1729.
25 Id. at 1728-29.
26 Id. at 1727.
27 Id. at 1721. The Arkansas Supreme Court praised the trial court and Simmons' counsel for performing "an exceptional job in examining and exploring
[Simmons'] capacity to understand the choices between life and death and his ability to know and to intelligently waive any and all right he might have in an appeal of
his sentence." Id. at 1722 (quoting Simmons v. State, 298 Ark. 193, 194, 766
S.W.2d 422, 423 (1989)). Additionally, the Arkansas Court stated that "Simmons'
counsel 'thoroughly discussed seven possible points that could be argued for reversal on appeal' and that Simmons acknowledged those points but 'rejected all encouragement and suggestions to appeal.' " Id. at 1722 (citing Simmons, 298 Ark. at
194, 766 S.W.2d at 423).
28 Id. at 1727.
29 Id. at 1726.
30 Id.
3' Id. (citing 31 Car. II, ch. 2).
32 Id. at 1726-27 (quoting Ashby v. White, 14 How. St. Tr. 695, 814 (Q.B.
1704)).
33 180 U.S. 81 (1901).
34 Id. at 82. The prisoner, Samuel Wright, was sentenced to death for assault
with the intent to commit rape. Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 87. The Court reasoned that "[hiowever friendly he may be to the
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have denied the plaintiff standing under a habeas corpus petition."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
United States ex rel Bryant v. Houston,-" denied next friend standing in
connection with a habeas corpus petition. 9 The Second Circuit
based its decision on the extent of the relationship between the petitioner and the detainee.4 ° Acknowledging the validity of next friend
standing in many circumstances, 4 ' the court, dismissed the writ.42
The court stressed that next friend standing requires the petitioner
to display a significant relation to the detainee and to set forth a
satisfactory explanation for the prisoner's failure to verify the petition himself.43 The court concluded that next friend standing "was
not intended ... [to] be availed of, as a matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends. 4 4
Seven years after Houston, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Collins v. Taeger4 5 permitted next friend standing in connection
with a habeas corpus writ asserted on behalf of a detained prisoner
who was incapable of pursuing his own petition. 46 The court indicated that in order for the article III standing requirements to be
met, the petitioner must have been given authorization by the prisoner to act in his behalf.47 The court reasoned that in this case the
petitioner was properly acting under the prisoner's authorization
because the prisoner was barred from asserting his own writ due to
the pending removal of the case from the court's jurisdiction. 4 8
doomed man and sympathetic for his situation, however concerned he may be lest
unconstitutional laws be enforced, and however laudable such sentiments are, the
grievance they suffer and feel is not special enough to furnish a cause like this." Id.
37 Id. The court, however, has provided exceptions to habeas corpus petitions
regarding deportation. See United States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchorn, 164 F. 152
(S.D.N.Y. 1908) (often in a deportation case, infancy, incompetency or time constraints require verification of writ of habeas corpus by the prisoner's counsel).
38 273 F. 915 (2d Cir. 1921).
39 Id.
40 Id. The court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus cannot be made on the
application of any person without explanation. Id.
41 Id. at 916. The court described these circumstances as ones in which the prisoner is unable to bring his own petition or refuses to do so. Id. Common situations
occur when the prisoner does not understand the English language, does not have
access to the courts or is not mentally competent and waives all petitioning powers.
Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 915.
44 Id. at 916.
45 27 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1928).
46 Id. at 843.
47 ld.
48 Id.

The court also indicated that since no one objected to the petitioner's
standing in the trial court, that objection could not be made on appeal. Id.
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In Wilson v. Dixon,4 9 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
next friend standing to a fellow inmate. ° In Wilson, the petitioner
brought a writ of habeas corpus on the prisoner's behalf because the
prisoner was unable to obtain a writ of habeas corpus. 5' The court
denied the writ, positing that the petitioner failed to show a significant relation to the prisoner and a satisfactory reason why the pris5
oner did not verify the complaint himself. 1
The Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of whether
next friend standing is allowed when asserted on behalf of a capital
prisoner who has Waived his right to appeal his sentence. 53 In Gilmore v. Utah,54 the Supreme Court vacated a temporary stay of execution which was previously granted to the prisoner's mother. 5
49 256 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1958).
50 Id. at 537.
51 Id. at 537. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1971) provides that an application for a
writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for
whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.... Wilson, 256 F.2d at 537
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1971)) (emphasis added)(the writ must set forth ajudicially appropriate basis explaining the reason why the prisoner had not attested to
the complaint and the identity of the next friend).
52 Wilson, 256 F.2d at 537-38. The court further claimed the complaint was insufficient because it failed to show that the accused exhausted all of the remedies
available to him. Id. Specifically, the court argued that neither the petitioner nor
the prisoner sought relief in a California court. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned
they were unable to obtain jurisdiction over the case. The court referenced 28
U.S.C. § 2254 which provided:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the state, or that there is either an absence of
available state corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. An applicant shall be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the state, within the meaning of this section,
if he has the right under the law of the state to raise, by any available
procedure, the questions presented.
Wilson, 256 F.2d at 537-38 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1979)).
Additionally, the court affirmed the Houston proposition that next friend standing "was not intended [to] be availed of, . . . by intruders or uninvited meddlers,
styling themselves as next friends." Id. at 538 (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant
v. Houston, 273 E. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921)).
53 See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990); Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S.
1306 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice (1979)), stay of execution denied, 444 U.S. 807 (1979)
(mem.); Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice (1979)), stay of
execution denied, 440 U.S. 987 (1979); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (mem.);
see generally Note, Capital Punishment: A Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52
Notre Dame L. Rev. 261 (1976) (discussion of recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the death penalty and their impact).
54 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
55 Id. at 1013.
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Bessie Gilmore sought next friend standing on behalf of her son,
Gary Gilmore, who had waived his right to appeal his capital sentence. 56 After careful review of the lower court competency hearing, a divergent Court 57 affirmed that Gilmore "knowingly and
intelligently waived all his federal rights." 58
56 Id. at 1013. Gilmore also repeatedly insisted on carrying out his conviction.
Id. at 1013 n. 1. He not only sought death, but carried on a media campaign to help
the unnecessary delay of his execution. See Urofsky, A Right to Die: Termination of
Appeal For Condemned Prisoners, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 554 (1984). Gilmore's views were adequately expressed in a letter he wrote to the Utah Supreme
Court which was subsequently published nationwide. It read:
Don't the people of Utah have the courage of their convictions? You
sentence a man to die.. .and when I accept this most extreme punishment with grace and dignity, you, the people of Utah want to back
down and argue with one about it. You're silly. Look, I am sane,
rational and more intelligent than the average person. I've been sentenced to die. I accept that. Let's do it and the hell with all the bullshit. Most sincerely--Gary Gilmore
Note, The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?, 54 S.CAL. L. REV. 575,
631 (1981).
57 ChiefJustice Burger, in a concurring opinion, stated that Bessie Gilmore did
not have next friend standing to petition her son's sentence because Gary Gilmore
was competent enough to bring his own appeal. Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1014 (Burger,
C.J., concurring). Justice Powell joined in this concurrence. Id. at 1013 (Burger,
CJ. concurring). In a separate concurrence, Justice Stevens added that the record
not only adequately displayed Gilmore's competency, but also clearly indicated that
Gilmore was never denied access to assert his appeal. Id. at 1017 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist joined in this concurrence. Id.
In three separate dissents, Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun, articulated
the reasons for denying next friend standing to Bessie Gilmore. See id. at 1018-20.
Justice White, questioned the constitutionality of the Utah death penalty statute. Id.
at 1018 (White, J., dissenting). The Justice noted that Gary Gilmore may not waive
his appellate rights until the constitutionality of the state statute is resolved in state
court. Id. Justice White determined that since these rights were not waivable, there
was no jurisdictional barrier to preclude Gilmore's mother from petitioning the
Court. Id. In a separate dissent, Justice Marshall agreed with Justice White that a
criminal defendant cannot consent to execution pursuant to an unconstitutional
statute. Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further stated that
the record did not adequately support the fact that Gilmore knowingly, intelligently
and competently waived his right to appeal. Id. at 1019. Justice Marshall vigorously asserted that Gilmore's suicide attempt as well as the inadequacy of the state's
psychiatric examination strongly supported the prisoner's incompetency. Id. at
1019. Justice Blackmun maintained that an issue concerning whether a convicted
capital defendant's mother has standing to assert her son's constitutional rights is
one of extreme magnitude, and therefore deserving of a plenary hearing. Id. at
1020 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58 Id. Gilmore was executed in 1977 by a firing squad. See Strafer, Volunteering
For Execution: Competency, Voluntarinessand the Proprietyof Third Party Intervention, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 865-66 (1983). Justice Marshall noted that since
1976, when the death penalty was reinstated, Gary Gilmore has been the only person to be executed without any appellate review of his sentence. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1733 (1990). The Justice further noted that following
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Three years later, in Evans v. Bennett,59 the Supreme Court
granted a stay of execution to Betty Evans, mother of convicted
murderer, John Louis Evans.60 Evans was unable to waive his appeal because the Alabama capital punishment statute provides for
an automatic appellate review of every capital sentence. 6 ' The appellate court, however, affirmed Evans' sentence.6 2 Betty Evans
subsequently filed a next friend petition contending that her son
was not competent to pursue his own appeal.63 Justice Rehnquist,
writing as a Circuit Justice, found that Evans was competent enough
to knowingly and intelligently waive his post-conviction rights.64
The Justice stipulated that, given the circumstances, Evans' choice
to accept a quick death over life in prison was rational.65 Justice
Rehnquist, however, permitted Betty Evans' stay of execution pending further consideration by the full Court 66 which ultimately vaGilmore's execution, Utah changed its capital punishment statute to require a
mandatory, nonwaivable appeal of each sentence. Id.
59 440 U.S. 1301 stay of exeuction denied, 440 U.S. 987 (1979) (mem.) (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice (1979)).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 The sentence and judgment were affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals and the Supreme Court of Alabama. See Evans v. State, 361 So.2d 654
(Ala. Crim. App. 1977); Evans v. State, 361 So.2d 666 (Ala. 1978). Subsequently, a
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed; however, the writ was denied by the
Supreme Court. See Evans v. Alabama, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
63 Evans, 440 U.S. at 1301. To support the claim of her son's incompetency,
Betty Evans presented a psychiatrist's affidavit which stated that Evans was "not
able to deal rationally with his situation and... probably needs someone to make
legal decisions affecting his life for him." The Court, however, noted that the psychiatrist never personally interviewed or examined Evans. Id. at 1304. Additionally, the Court stressed that Evans was competent to stand trial and there were no
intervening physical or mental disabilities between the time of trial and his
mother's filing for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. Accordingly, the Court reasoned
"[c]learly one who is competent to stand trial is competent to make decisions as to
the course of his future." Id.
64 Id. at 1305.
65 Id. Specifically, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The fact that Evans has elected not to pursue post-conviction remedies that would serve to forestall the impending execution is not controlling, since it may well be . . . that John Evans has confronted his
option of life imprisonment or death by execution and has elected to
place his bets on a new existence in some world beyond this. The
Court finds no evidence of irrationality in this; indeed ... it may well
be that John Evans has made the more rational choice.
Id.
66 Id. Justice Rehnquist articulated that "[i]f I were casting my vote on this application for a stay as a Member of the full Court, I would vote to deny the stay."
Id. at 1303. TheJustice instead reasoned that as surrogate of the full-Court he was
required to grant the stay. Id. at 1306. In reaching his decision, Justice Rehnquist
examined the dissenting opinions of Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, Jus-
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cated the stay.6 7
Justice Rehnquist again acting as Circuit Justice, decided
Lenhard v. Wolff later the same year. 68 In Lenhard, a convicted murderer, Jesse Walter Bishop, also waived his right to appeal his capital sentence.6 9 Subsequently, two Nevada public defenders filed for
a stay of execution acting as next friends on Bishop's behalf.70 The
attorneys asserted that their moral and ethical obligations as
Bishop's representatives provided them with adequate grounds for
next friend standing. 7 ' Justice Rehnquist affirmed the lower court's
findings, 72 and concluded that Bishop was competent 73 when he
tice Marshall and Justice Blackmun in Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
Based on these dissents, Justice Rehnquist posited:
Were this a case involving an issue other than the death penalty, I
think I would be justified in concluding that because the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court have fully
reviewed Evans' conviction and sentence, the same considerations
which led four Members of this Court to disagree with our denial of a
stay of execution in Gilmore's case would not necessarily lead all of
them to do so here. But because of the obviously irreversible nature
of the death penalty and because of my obligation as CircuitJustice to
act as surrogate for the Court, I do not feel justified in denying the
stay on that assumption.
Id.
67 Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 987 (1979) (mem.). Eventually Betty Evans convinced her son to pursue his own appeal. Urofsky, supra note 56, at 561. The process continued for another four years. Id. In the end, Evans' sentence was affirmed
and he was executed on April 22, 1983. Id.
68 443 U.S. 1306 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice (1979)), stay of execution denied, 444
U.S. 807 (1979) (mem.).
69 Id. at 1307.
70 Id. at 1308.
71 See id.
72 Id. at 1311. At the circuit court level, Judge Sneed, in a concurring opinion
concluded:
I am convinced that Bishop is sane and that he has made a knowing
and intelligent choice to forego his federal remedies. Bishop is an
individual who, for reasons I can fathom only slightly, has chosen to
forego his federal remedies. Assuming his competence, which on this
record I must, he should be free to so choose. To deny him that
would be to incarcerate his spirit - the one thing which remains free
and which the state need not and should not imprison.
Lenhard v. Wolff, 603 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (Sneed, J.,
concurring).
73 Lenhard, 443 U.S. at 1312. Justice Rehnquist specifically wrote:
Bishop was found to be competent at the time of trial by three psychiatrists; he was observed by the panel of three judges during the penalty hearing; he was observed in a subsequent proceeding before the
trial court on July 25, 1979; he appeared personally before the United
States District Court on August 23, 1979; and he was examined by a
licensed psychiatrist on August 21, 1979. On none of these occasions
was there an indication to those responsible persons that he was in-

164

SETON HALL L4 W REVIEW

[Vol.
21:155
[

knowingly and intelligently chose not to pursue his appeal.7 4 Justice
75
Rehnquist explained that he believed the stay should be denied.
As in Evans, however, the Justice determined that the stay should be
granted until disposition of the matter by the full Court due to his
obligation as surrogate of the Court and considering the "irreversible nature"of the penalty.7 6 In a memorandum decision, Lenhard v.
Wolff, 7 7. the Court denied the application for the stay of execution. 7
In Whitmore v. Arkansas,79 the Supreme Court issued its first full
opinion concerning applications for stays of execution asserted by
next friends of capital prisoners.8 " Chief Justice Rehnquist began
his analysis in Whitmore by explaining that the Court could not address Whitmore's claim on the merits until he had established his
entitlement to standing.8 ' The Court maintained that in order to
establish standing, a party must prove that he is the appropriate entity to assert the claim.8 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist added that this
competent. We find there has been no evidence of incompetence sufficient to warrant a hearing on the issue.
Id.
Id. Bishop was executed on October 22, 1979. Note, supra note 56, at 589.
Lenhard, 443 U.S. at 1312-13.
Id.
444 U.S. 807 (1979) (mem.).
Id. at 808. Justice Marshall, in dissent, expressed his belief that the death
penalty was an unconstitutional form of punishment. Id. at 808 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Hence, the dissent opined that all capital sentences should be automatically reviewed whether or not the defendant authorized the appeal. Id. at 810
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall reasoned that a mandatory, nonwaivable
appeal would adequately secure the eighth amendment protections afforded to the
defendant as well as to society as a whole. Id. at 810-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall claimed that "society's interest in the protections afforded by the
eighth amendment cannot be compromised by a defendant's waiver." Id. at 811
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that if the state allowed Bishop to
waive his right to appeal it would essentially be assisting him in committing suicide.
Id. at 811-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990).
80 Id. at 1722. Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated:
Since Gilmore, we have been presented with other applications from
third parties for stays of execution, see Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S.
1306 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice (1979)), stay of execution denied, 444
U.S. 807 (1979) (mem.); Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice (1979)), stay of execution denied, 440 U.S. 987 (1979)
[(mem.)] [(Circuit Justice Rehnquist granted stay of execution as surrogate of full Court, subsequently full Court vacated stay in memorandum opinion)]; but until the present case, we have not requested full
briefing and argument and issued an opinion of the Court on this recurring issue.
Id. Additionally, in Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976), the Court issued a brief
order instead of a full opinion. Id. at 1012.
81 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1722.
82 Id. at 1722-23 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Amns. United for Sep74
75
76
77
78
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prerequisite reinforces the limitation on a federal court's power to
hear only those disputes which satisfy the article III "case or controversy" requirement.83
Recognizing the Courts' historically inconsistent application of
the doctrine of standing, the Court nonetheless reiterated that certain basic principles exist which must be met.8 4 ChiefJustice Rehnquist maintained that a party must demonstrate an "injury in fact"
in which the injury or harm is either actual, concrete, palpable or
imminent.8 5 The Chief Justice stressed that an abstract, conjectural
8 6
or hypothetical injury is an insufficient basis to grant standing.
Additionally, the Justice indicated that a party must show that the
injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action, [and] is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision."8 " The Court explained that
without a party presenting facts sufficient to support its allegation of
standing a federal court cannot expand its jurisdictional power,
hence, a party must present factual proof to support the proposition
88
that the party has standing.
Utilizing these basic principles, the Court first denied Whitmore standing in his individual capacity.8 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist
dismissed Whitmore's principal "injury in fact" claim 9 ° because it
was much too speculative to serve as a basis for granting standing. 91
aration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982)). See also supra notes
3-4 and accompanying text.
83 Whitmore, 110 S.Ct. at 1723.
84

Id.

Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). See also supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
86 Whitmore, 110 S.Ct. at 1723 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02
(1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)).
87 Id. The Court refers to this second principle as the "causation" and
"redressable" prongs of article III. Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)).
88 Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
85

89 Id.
90 Id. Specifically, Whitmore's "injury in fact" claim was contingent upon Ar-

kansas' system of comparative review of all death sentences. Id. Whitmore claimed
he had "a direct and substantial interest in having the data base against which his
crime is compared to be complete and to not be arbitrarily skewed by the omission
of any other capital case." Id. Whitmore further reasoned that Simmons' crime
was much more severe and heinous and therefore would belittle his crime in a future comparison. Id. at 1724.
91 Id. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) (Court denied physician
standing based on speculative injury that legislative restriction on abortions results
in fewer paying patients); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (Court denied
individual standing based on hypothetical injury that if arrested by a certain police
officer, officer would administer illegal chokehold upon him); Ashcroft v. Mattis,
431 U.S. 171 (1977) (Court denied plaintiff standing based on speculative injury
claim that if arrested by certain police officer, officer would use deadly force on

166

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:155

The Court further opined that even if Whitmore's injury was foreseeable, Whitmore provided no factual support to prove that Simmons' decision to waive an appeal had any relation to his injury.9 2
The majority dismissed Whitmore's next claim that as a citizen
he was entitled to certain protections which are afforded to the public pursuant to the eighth amendment.9 3 Whitmore asserted that he
had a constitutional right to prevent the Court from carrying out an
execution without proper appellate review.9 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist stressed that this was an inadequate ground for standing because an individual cannot invoke the power of the courts merely by
claiming that the government has violated the law.9 5 Additionally,
the majority rejected Whitmore's assertion that the Court should es96
tablish a special type of standing for capital punishment cases.
Whitmore argued that the irreversible nature of the death penalty
and society's compelling interest in assuring that the punishment is
properly imposed warranted this special exception.9 7 The Court refuted Whitmore's position by claiming that it cannot expand its jurisdictional powers by creating policy exceptions to constitutionally
mandated law.9 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that Whitmore
did not have individual standing to assert his eighth amendment
objection. 9 9
The Court next addressed Whitmore's second basis for standing as a next friend of Simmons.'
The majority, identified two
conditions that must be met before next friend standing is
him); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (Court denied town resident standing based on hypothetical injury that if brought before certain tribunal in the future, resident would suffer from the judge's alleged illegal procedures). But see
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (Court permitted standing of environmental group challenging Interstate Commerce Commission ruling enabling
railroads to access surcharge for transporting recyclable materials).
In Whitmore, the Court noted that SCRAP was "probably the most attenuated
injury conferring [a]rticle III standing... and that SCRAP surely went to the very
outer limits of the law ......
Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1725.
92 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1724. Specifically, the Court stated that "Whitmore
provides no factual basis for us to conclude that the sentence imposed on a mass
murderer like Simmons would even be relevant to a future comparative review of
Whitmore's sentence." Id.
93 Id. at 1725.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1725-26 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984)).
96 Id. at 1726.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.

100 Id.
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granted.' ° ' First, the Court maintained that a next friend must
show that the real party in interest is unable to pursue his own appeal because of mental incompetency, inaccessibility or some other
disability.' °2 The Chief Justice affirmed the lower court's finding
that Simmons had the mental competency to make an intelligent
and knowing waiver of his right to appeal.' 03 The Court concluded
that Whitmore failed to prove that Simmons was incompetent or
otherwise disabled. 0 4 The majority reasoned that because Simmons was capable of pursuing his
own appeal, he did not need a
10 5
next friend to assert his rights.
Next, the Court articulated that an individual pursuing next
friend status must be motivated by the desire to act in the capital
prisoner's best interest. 10 6 Noting that next friend standing is not
automatically granted to every petitioner who chooses to pursue an
action on another's behalf, the Court mandated that the petitioner
establish some significant relation to the prisoner. 0 7 The Court determined that Whitmore not only failed to demonstrate that he was
acting in Simmons' best interests, but that he also failed to show any
meaningful relation to Simmons.'0 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that by imposing such restrictions on next friend standing,
the courts limit intrusions by "uninvited meddlers, styling themselves as next friends."'0 9 Accordingly, the Court held that Whit01 Id. at 1727.

Id. (citing Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989)).
Id. at 1728 (citing Simmons v. State, 298 Ark. 193, 194, 766 S.W.2d 422, 423
(1989) (per curiam)). The Court had three grounds upon which it affirmed Simmons' competency determination:
(1) Simmons' answers to questions he was asked by both the court and counsel at
trial and after his conviction. Id. These answers displayed that he clearly understood all of the possible remedies available to him and the consequences of each
one. Id.
(2) A psychiatric interview in which Simmons stated that he felt it would be "a
terrible miscarriage ofjustice for a person to kill people and not be executed." Id.
(3) The absence of meaningful evidence displaying any sign of mental disease, disorder or defect that would impair Simmons' ability to make a rational decision. Id.
102
103

104

Id.

105

Id. at 1728-29.

106 Id. at 1727. The majority noted that Whitmore was not seeking a writ of

habeas corpus. Id. at 1728. Rather, Whitmore was attempting to appeal Simmons'
death sentence. Id. "Under these circumstances, there is no federal statute authorizing the participation of 'next friends'." Id. See 28 U S.C. § 2254 (1977).
107 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1728. See, e.g., Davis v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 273, 27576 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (capital prisoner's minister and first cousin denied next friend
standing).
108 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1728.
109 Id. at 1727-28 (quoting United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915,
916 (2d Cir. 1921)).
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more did not have next friend standing to bring a petition to
challenge Simmons' sentence. t 0
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall joined by Justice Brennan, began his analysis by asserting that the death penalty is a
unique form of punishment due to its irrevocable nature."' The
Justice opined that the Court should therefore utilize every available
measure to ensure that the sentence is not arbitrarily or capriciously
imposed." 2 The dissent also advocated a mandatory appellate review of every execution sentence to ensure that the sentence was not
illegally imposed."'
Justice Marshall expressed his belief that capital appeals are
constitutionally mandated procedures that are required by the
eighth and fourteenth amendments in order to assure that states
provide adequate protection against wrongful executions. 14 In
support of its stance, the dissent presented statistical proof of the
high percentage of death sentences that are subsequently reversed
on appeal.1 5 The Justice asserted that this proof demonstrates that
each capital sentence necessitates a mandatory, nonwaivable appel16
late review.'
Justice Marshall further pointed out that capital appeals are not
only necessary to protect a defendant against cruel and unusual
punishment, but are also necessary to protect society as a whole
from a state's unwarranted exercise of its police power." 7 In addi11o Id. at 1729.
'"1

Id. at 1729-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

112 Id. The Justice stated:

Under the [e]ighth [a]mendment, the death penalty has been treated
differently from all other punishments. Among the most important
and consistent themes in this Court's death penalty jurisprudence is
the need for special care and deliberation in decisions that may lead
to the imposition of that sanction. The Court has accordingly imposed a series of unique substantive and procedural restrictions
designed to ensure that capital punishment is not imposed without
the serious and calm reflection that ought to precede any decision of
such gravity and finality.
Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
"13 Id. at 1731 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890
(1983) (Court claimed its decision to uphold the Georgia death penalty statute was
contingent upon legislative mandatory appellate review provision); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Court upheld Georgia's procedures for capital sentencing
because its legislature required appeal for every death sentence).
114 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1731-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 1731 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1732 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012,
1019 (1976)).
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tion, the Justice posited that "a defendant's voluntary submission to
a barbaric punishment does not ameliorate the harm that imposing
such a punishment causes to our basic societal values and to the
integrity of our system ofjustice."' 8 The dissent noted that almost
every state which allows the death penalty has required a nonwaivable, automatic review of at least the capital sentence."19 Justice
Marshall claimed that this uniformity is further evidence that society
118 Id.
119

Id. at 1733 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted:
Thirteen States, by statute, rule, or case law, explicitly provide that
review of at least the capital sentence will occur with or without the
defendant's election or participation. ALA. CODE § 12-22-150 (1986);
CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 1239(b) (West Supp. 1990); People v.

Stanworth, 71 Cal.2d 820, 832-34, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 58-59, 457 P.2d

889,898-99 (1969);

DEL. CODE ANN.

Tit. 11, § 4209(g) (1987); Goode

v. State, 365 So.2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1978) (construing Fla. Stat.
§ 921.141(4) (1989)); ILL REV. STAT., ch. 11OA, I 606(a) (1987);Judy
v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 157-58, 416 N.E.2d 94, 102 (1981) (construing
IND. CODE

§ 35-50-2-9 (1988)); Mo.

REV. STAT.

§ 565.035 (1986);

NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.055(2) (1989); Cole v. State, 101 Nev. 585,
590, 707 P.2d 545, 548 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I1-3(e) (West
Supp. 1989); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 439-40, 383
A.2d 174, 181 (1978) (construing predecessor statute to 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9711 (h) (1988)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-205 (1982); State v.
Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah 1989) (construing UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-35-26(10) (Supp. 1989)); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3206(2) (1978); VT. RULE APp. PROC. 3(b). Twenty-two states' statutes
or rules employ language indicating that their appellate courts must

review at least the sentence in every capital case. ARIZ. RULE CRIM.
PROC. 31.2(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(7)(a) (Supp. 1989);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46b (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2827 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075
(Michie 1985); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., Art. 905.9 (West 1984);
MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 27, § 414 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105
(Supp. 1989); Morr. CODE ANN. § 46-18-307 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2525 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI) (1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(l)
(1988); OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, § 201.13 (Supp. 1989); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150(l)(g) (1989); S.C. CODE § 16-3-25 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 23A-27A-9 (1988); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(h)

1990); VA. CODE § 17-110.1 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.100 (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-103 (1988). Ohio's rule as to
waiver is unclear. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05 (1987). In
State v. Brooks, 25 Ohio St. 3d 144, 495 N.E.2d 407 (1986), however,
both the Ohio Court of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court reviewed
the defendant's death sentence after the state court of appeals denied
his motion to withdraw his appeal.
Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1733 n. I (Marshall,J, dissenting). TheJustice further noted
that the Supreme Court of Arkansas is the only state supreme court that has precluded all appellate review when waived by a competent capital prisoner. Id. See
Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 196-97, 754 S.W.2d 839, 847 (1988) (Glaze, J., concurring and dissenting).
(Supp.
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has a monumental interest in requiring a mandatory, nonwaivable
appellate review. 120 The Justice stressed that even though some
death row inmates may prefer execution over life in prison, society
still has a duty to see that the state entitles the prisoner to every
2
procedural safeguard before taking his life.' '
Justice Marshall next condemned the majority for rigidly applying the requirements of the next friend standing doctrine in denying
Whitmore's claim.' 22 The Justice acknowledged that the Court has
the power to amend any common law doctrine when a critical societal or judicial interest is at stake.' 23 The Justice added that by not
relaxing the requirements of that doctrine, the Court is allowing a
voluntary execution to take place without ensuring that the sentence
was fairly imposed. 124 The dissent charged that the Court was more
concerned with preventing judicial access to "uninvited meddlers"
than with society's more compelling interest in prohibiting an unwarranted execution of an innocent human being. 25 Justice Marshall concluded that the majority's holding not only promotes
unwarranted killings by the state, but also impedes the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the convicted defendant in particular and
26

of society in general. 1

In Whitmore v. Arkansas, the Court aptly displayed the importance of adhering to the basic principles of standing to limit federal
120 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1732 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Justice based his
proposition on Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174 (1978)
which provided that:
The doctrine of waiver developed not only out of a sense of fairness
to an opposing party but also as a means of promoting jurisprudential
efficiency by avoiding appellate court determinations of issues which
the appealing party had failed to preserve. It was not, however,
designed to block giving effect to a strong public interest, which itself
is a jurisprudential concern. It is evident from the record that [the
convicted defendant sentenced to death] personally prefers death to
spending the remainder of his life in prison. While this may be a genuine conviction on his part, the waiver concept was never intended as
a means of allowing a criminal defendant to choose his own sentence.
The waiver rule cannot be exalted to a position so lofty as to require
this [c]ourt to blind itself to the real issue - the propriety of allowing
the state to conduct an illegal execution of a citizen.
McKenna, 476 Pa. at 441, 383 A.2d at 181.
121 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1734 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

122

See id.

Id. at 1735 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that since next
friend standing is a common law doctrine and not a constitutional mandate, the
Court should expand the doctrine. Id.
124 Id. at 1737 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 1736 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 See id. at 1736-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123
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court jurisdiction.' 2 7 In this particular instance, the Court correctly
denied Whitmore standing in his individual capacity because he
failed to demonstrate that he was exposed to the kind of injury sufficient to assert his claim.' 2 8 More significantly, the Court cleverly
unmasked Whitmore's next friend claim revealing a clearer picture
of the unwelcomed "uninvited meddler."' 2 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist properly ruled that Whitmore failed to display any significant
relation to Simmons, that Simmons was incompetent or otherwise
30
disabled, or that Whitmore was acting in Simmons' best interests.
The Court poignantly determined that Whitmore was acting pursuant to his own interests and was therefore not entitled to next friend
standing. 131
From Gilmore to Whitmore, the Court has consistently based its
denial of next friend standing on the petitioner's failure to adequately establish the prisoner's incompetence.1 32 In fact, it is questionable whether a capital prisoner is capable of making a
competent decision while facing the realities of "life" on death row.
Prisoners have defined this lifestyle as a "living death" existence
known for its "barbaric conditions [which have] debilitating and lifenegating effects on [each prisoner]."1 33 Typically, a death row inmate's environment is in itself an independent source of stress and
suffering.' 34 Consequently, the prisoner's ability to think clearly
and rationally may be hampered by the overwhelming pressure of
his environment. 35 The inmate is faced with the dubious choice of
See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1724.
See Wilson v. Dixon, 256 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1958); United States ex rel.
Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921).
130 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1727-28.
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (1990) (Court denied death
row inmate next friend standing because he did not prove that fellow inmate incompetently waived his right to appeal); Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice (1979)), stay of execution denied, 444 U.S. 807 (1979) (mem.)
(Court denied public defenders next friend standing because they did not prove
that capital prisoner incompetently waived his right to appeal); Evans v. Bennett,
440 U.S. 1301 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice (1979)), stay of execution denied, 440 U.S.
987 (1979) (mem.) (Court denied capital prisoner's mother next friend standing
because she did not prove that her son incompetently waived his right to appeal);
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (Court denied capital prisoner's mother
next friend standing because she did not prove that her son incompetently waived
his right to appeal).
133 Strafer, supra note 58, at 869.
134 Id. at 868.
135 Id. Specifically, the experience has been described as:
[A] painful oscillation between hope and despair. 'It's just like you
are in the middle of a vice and one part of the vice is pulling you this
127
128
129
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selecting the slow torture of life in prison or the horror and certainty of death. Accordingly, the prisoner is placed in a situation
that often entices him to choose the quick way out-to abandon all
appeals and accept his death sentence, for any delay will just pro36

long the torture.1

The inmate's hopeless existence causes him debilitating stress
in which the trauma "play[s] a critical role in determining the nature
and outcome of [his] coping efforts."'' 3 7 Because the inmate struggles to cope with an irreconcilable situation, any decision the inmate
makes will be tainted. In light of the foregoing, the Court's requirement that a next friend prove an inmate's incompetence is anomalous, because the inmate's environment alone casts significant doubt
upon his ability to make competent decisions.
Perhaps in the future judicial inquiry should focus on whether a
more objective next friend would be capable of representing the inmate. Allowing this objective next friend standing to challenge a
death sentence on behalf of a capital prisoner, whose mental capacity is suspect, would protect both the interests of the state as well as
the individual prisoner.' 3 The state may assume this role in its exercise of parens patriae authority.'33 Traditionally, the state uses
the parens patriae power to act as a guardian of incompetents, minors or other legally disabled persons. 4 '
Opponents of such state interference advocate the inmate's individual fundamental rights to privacy and death over the state's
way and one of them is pulling you the other way. And the vice is
sharp.' Within parameters of one's existence cast in terms of uncertain hope and uncertain despair, arduous and recurring battles for
peace of mind ensue. Id.
136 See id. at 872. Specifically one California inmate stated, "I would rather go
downstairs to that gas chamber then [sic] have to spend the rest of my life here.
Being free is being alive. If a person goes down to the gas chamber he's escaped.
It is going to cost him his life, but he's escaped." Id. (footnote omitted).
137

Id. at 871.

Note, supra note 56, at 597. A capital defendant's death wish has been viewed
as a "prima facie evidence of mental incapacity." Id. at 597 n. 150.
139 Id. The parens patriae power has been defined as "a power which the members of the community have granted the state for the protection of their future wellbeing." Id. at 597 (footnote omitted). This power originated under English common law, which authorized the king to act as "general guardian of all infants, idiots
and lunatics." Id. at 597 n.152 (quoting Note, Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1208 (1974)). Specifically, "[tlhe
sovereign, as father of the country, was responsible for the care and custody of 'all
selves.' In acting as parens patriae, the King . . .was required to promote the
interests and welfare of his wards and was not empowered to sacrifice the ward's
welfare to the welfare of others." Id. (quoting Note, Developments in the Law - Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1207-08 (1974)).
138

140

Id. at 597.
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general interests. 4 ' The state's interest in the preservation of life,
however, is more compelling and is firmly rooted in a longstanding
constitutional foundation which requires that it not be abridged in
furtherance of a private or individual fundamental interest. 14 2 Accordingly, the state exercises its police power to protect the welfare
and safety of its citizens as a whole. It frequently prevents society's
members from voluntarily engaging in dangerous activities. 4 ' This
duty is based upon the state's interest in preserving the family,
economy and the general welfare of society. 144 As a result, the individual's private interest is overridden by the greater interest of society as a whole.
By analogy, the state as parens patriae has a duty to protect the
prisoner from foregoing an appeal when such waiver is a product of
unbalanced or illogical judgments. 14 1 Similarly, next friend standing should be accorded the same deference given to the state when
exercising its authority as parens patriae. For unlike Whitmore, persons acting under the parens patriae doctrine are acting in the best
interests of the prisoner and society in general. Under this analysis,
a careful case-by-case review would not only screen out the "uninvited meddler," but would also protect the greater interests of society and the significant individual fundamental rights of the prisoner.
Lisa Ann Chiappetta
141 For further discussion of the inmate's right to die and right to privacy, see
Note, supra note 56, at 603-14.
142 Id. at 614-15. For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that
the state has a compelling interest in preserving the life of a child which cannot be
abridged by an individual's fundamental interest in freedom of religion. See, e.g.,
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (state
required Jehovah Witness' to allow hospital to give their children blood transfusions to save the child's life, even though such action was against religious beliefs).
143 Note, supra note 56 at 597. The state for example has a duty to prevent suicide. For further discussion see id. at 617-19.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 618.

